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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OMA C. STRONG, 
Plaintiff-Respondent/ 
-vs-
TED J. STRONG, 
Defendant-Appellant 
CASE NO. 14182 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
TED J. STRONG 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to modify 
a divorce decree. Defendant subsequently moved to modify 
the same divorce decree. Both motions were heard on May 1, 
1976. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT' 
The Trial Court denied both the plaintiff's and the 
defendant's motions to modify the divorce decree and awarded 
judgment against the defendant in the amount of $1,450.00 for 
delinquent child support plus $100 attorney's fees and costs 
and ordered the defendant to commence alimony and child support 
payments as per the divorce decree beginning May 1, 1975. The 
plaintiff was denied judgment for delinquent alimony payments. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant, Ted J. STrong, seeks a reversal 
of that part of the Judgment, Decree and Order entered on the 
9th day of June, 1975, which requires the defendant to 
commence alimony payment as of May 1, 1975 and which denies 
the relief sought by the defendant to the effect that the 
Release executed by the plaintiff and introduced in evidence 
as Exhibit 2-D constituted a permanent release of defendant's 
obligation to pay alimony to the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced by a Divorce Decree 
entered on February 14, 1962. In April of 1971, plaintiff 
asked the defendant to advance her the sum of $2,000 to be 
used as a down payment on a home in Sandy, Utah (R. 7,8). 
Defendant testified that the plaintiff agreed to release him 
from his alimony and child support for his daughter Carolyn 
if he would give her the $2,000 (R. 35, 36). Plaintiff then 
presented a Stipulation in Support of Motion to Modify Decree 
of Divorce (Exhibit 1-D) providing, among other things, that 
in exchange for the $2,000, defendant would only have to pay 
$50 per month child support and $50 per month alimony for a 
period of two years instead of $150 per month child support 
and $50 per month alimony (R. 36). Defendant refused to sign 
said Stipulation because it did not reflect the terms of the 
initial agreement (R. 36). Plaintiff then wrote and executed 
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a document (Exhibit 2-D) stating: 
"To Whom It May Concern: 
"I do hereby agree to relinquish my alimony 
payments and child support of one child, (Carolyn 
Strong) for the sum of $1,000.00 each, respectively." 
(R. 18, 36). 
After receiving Exhibit 2-D, defendant delivered a check for 
$2,000 to plaintiff (R. 36). Plaintiff endorsed the check 
(R. 19). 
The defendant testified directly and unequivocally 
concerning the agreement between the parties. He stated em-
phatically that he refused to sign the plaintiff's Stipulation 
(Exhibit 1) (R. 36). The plaintiff's testimony concerning the 
same agreement was vague and uncertain. She did not remember 
the Stipulation (Exhibit 1), but did remember signing the 
Release of future alimony payments (Exhibit 2)(R. 18). 
During the period of time between the delivery of the 
$2,000 and the filing of this Motion to Modify Decree, 
approximately four years, the plaintiff made no request that 
defendant make any alimony or support payments (R. 36). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF FUTURE ALIMONY PAY-
MENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IS BINDING ON THE PARTIES. 
Although the Utah cases cast substantial doubt upon the 
rights of parents to agree between themselves as to their 
obligations concerning future payments of support money for 
minor children, there is no similar doubt with respect to the 
rights of the parties to come to an agreement with respect to 
payments due for alimony. In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Ut. 574, 
144 P. (2d) 528, the Court discussed the proposition that a 
decree for the payment of alimony operates as a judgment lien 
as to all past due and unpaid installments. The Court stated 
that the rule would be applicable "absent any competent facts 
to establish release, satisfaction, offsets, estoppel or other 
bases for reducing the amount for which execution should issue." 
(Emphasis supplied). Pac. Rep. 530. In Wallis v. Wallis (1958) 
9 Ut(2d) 237, 342 P.(2d) 103, Justice McDonough stated for 
the court: 
"The power of the parties to make agreements 
changing the monetary terms of a divorce decree 
is generally upheld except where future child 
support is concerned, absent hardship, fraud, 
duress, concealment, undue influence or mutual 
mistake." 
The Court cited the following cases: McKinney v. McKinney, 152 
Kan. 372, 103 P.2d 793; Hill v. Hill, 103 Colo. 492, 107 P.2d. 
597; Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 286 N.Y. 21, 38 N.E. 2d. 114; 
Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 NE 2d. 265; Apfelbaum. 
v. Apfelbaum, 111 N. J. Eq. 529, 162 A.543, 84 ALR 298; 
Higgins v. Higgins, Sup., 119 N.Y.S.2d 103; Cavenaugh v. 
Cavenaugh, 106 111. App. 209. Thus it appears that Utah 
follows the general rule insofar as alimony obligations are 
concerned, namely, that the parties themselves can come to 
an agreement in the nature of a release. 
There is no claim in the instant case, nor is there any 
basis for a claim in the nature of hardship, fraud, duress, 
concealment, undue influence or mutual mistake. 
Appellant respectfully suggests that the special rule 
applicable to agreements concerning future child support is 
not applicable to releases for future alimony payments. The 
same public policy questions are not applicable to alimony as 
to child support. It is well settled, for example, that if 
a divorced woman remarries, the obligation of the former husband 
to pay alimony ceases. The obligation of a father to support 
his minor child continues, however, regardless of such a 
remarriage. 
There is no legal or public policy consideration which 
prevents a wife from releasing a former husband's obligation 
to make future alimony payments and the Court should determine 
that in the instant case, insofar as plaintiff's claim to 
alimony is concerned, the unconditional release received in 
evidence as Exhibit D-2 binds the plaintiff in accordance 
with its terms. 
POINT II. 
IT IS CLEAR FROM THE TRIAL RECORD THAT THE PARTIES' 
INTENTION WAS TO BE BOUND BY THE UNCONDITIONAL 
RELEASE OF FUTURE ALIMONY PAYMENTS. 
A brief review of the communications between plaintiff 
and defendant and their actions prior and subsequent to the 
execution of the Release identified as Exhibit 2-D clearly 
demonstrates that both the plaintiff and the defendant under-
stood the terms of the Release, voluntarily entered into the 
agreement and fully intended to be bound by the terms of the 
Release. 
Sometime in 1971, the plaintiff approached the defendant 
with a proposal whereunder the defendant would advance the 
plaintiff the sum of $2,000 to be used as a down payment on a 
house, and in consideration therefor the plaintiff would un-
conditionally release the defendant from his obligation to pay 
alimony to the plaintiff and child support for Carolyn Strong 
(R. 7, 8, 35, 36). The defendant agreed to the terms of the 
proposal (R. 35, 36). Thereafter, plaintiff presented the 
defendant a Stipulation in Support of Motion to Modify Decree 
of Divorce (Exhibit 1-D) which contained substantially different 
terms than the initial agreement (R. 36). The Stipulation 
provided that the defendant would pay the plaintiff $2,000 
cash to be used as a down payment on a home and would also 
pay all dental bills of the three children in custody of the 
plaintiff. In exchange for these payments the defendant would 
be released from child support payments in the amount of $100 
per month for two years. Thus, in exchange for a Release 
from $25 00 of child support, defendant would have had to secure 
a loan in the amount of $2,000, pay interest on the money 
borrowed and additionally pay all dental bills for three children. 
The defendant refused to sign the Stipulation because its terms 
were opposite those agreed to previously (R. 36). Plaintiff 
then wrote and executed the Release identified as Exhibit 2-D 
which stated that for $1,000 the plaintiff would unconditionally 
relinquish her alimony payments from defendant and for another 
$1,000 she would unconditionally relinquish child support for 
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Carolyn. Plaintiff signed the Release and gave it to defendant 
in exchange for $2f000 (R. 36). 
It appears that the parties initially entered into a 
verbal agreement. The plaintiff later attempted to change 
the terms of the agreement by presenting the Stipulation 
(Exhibit 1-D) to defendant for signature. However, the Stipu-
lation was never executed. The plaintiff then drafted and 
executed a Release (Exhibit 2-D). She drafted or typed the 
document so she was familiar with its contents (R. 36). The 
Release, which by its terms was an unconditional release, was 
then voluntarily exchanged for the $2,000. At that point 
in time there was a meeting of the minds of the parties. 
Both parties understood the terms of the agreement and both 
parties performed their part of the agreement. For the next 
four years the parties indicated by their actions that they 
were bound by the Release. The plaintiff made no requests for 
alimony or child support payments (R. 36), even though she 
testified that she had incurred substantial debt during that 
period (R. 9, 10, 11). The defendant remarried in reliance 
upon the Release incurring additional financial responsibilities. 
(Defendant's Affidavit dated March 28, 1975). Both the plaintiff 
and defendant performed the terms of the agreement from 1971 
to 1975 and should continue to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
entered into an agreement whereby the defendant would pay to 
the plaintiff the sum of $2,000 in exchange for an unconditional 
release from his obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff and child 
support for the parties1 daughter, Carolyn. The child support 
portion of the agreement is not at issue. The agreement was 
made concerning future alimony. The defendant has performed 
his part of the agreement; the plaintiff has received the 
benefit of the agreement. The defendant has remarried and 
incurred increased financial responsibilities in reliance upon 
the agreement, and the parties should be bound by the agreement. 
Furthermore, the Utah courts have recognized the right of a 
spouse to release the other spouse from alimony payments. 
It is respectfully submitted that the agreement between 
the parties was entered into fairly and voluntarily, is not 
against public policy, and should be enforced releasing, 
defendant from all future alimony payments to the plaintiff. 
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